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In this issue, Fitzgerald et al. (2013) show that LIP neurons in monkeys encode categorically distinct
task conditions using a scalar code. Activity scales up or down to encode different categories, with neurons
maintaining proportional levels of activity in relation to one another.One of the primary goals of cognitive
neuroscience is to effectively equate cog-
nitive and neural processes. To achieve
this, experimenters design behavioral
paradigms in which determining the
correct behavioral response is contingent
upon a specific cognitive operation of
interest. They then measure neural
activity (through a variety of techniques
in a variety of species) during task per-
formance and relate the information
encoded by that neural activity to the
cognitive processing required. In studies
of the neural correlates of cognition in
monkeys, this approach has been ap-
plied to neural activity in the posterior
parietal cortex with considerable suc-
cess. For example, physiological signals
in this area have been identified at
the single-neuron level that carry informa-
tion about decisions (Kiani and Shadlen,
2009), categories (Freedman and Assad,
2006; Goodwin et al., 2012; Swaminathan
and Freedman, 2012), rules (Stoet and
Snyder, 2004), numbers (Nieder and
Miller, 2004), relationships (Chafee et al.,
2007), and time (Leon and Shadlen,
2003).
The information reflected in this neural
activity is relatively abstract, provides
a logical basis for selecting the appro-
priate action in the task, and typically
does not correlate with the attributes
of the specific stimuli or movements
involved—all characteristics one might
expect of neural signals that support
cognitive processing. However, demon-
strating a correspondence between
neural and cognitive representationsnecessarily involves making an inference
as to the nature of the cognitive process
taking place in the brain of a subject
based on the pattern of behavior that
one can observe. That inference is not
necessarily straightforward, insofar as
any single behavioral response could
be the product of a large number of
alternative cognitive operations. Further,
although we often assume humans and
monkeys share a core set of simple cogni-
tive abilities, the degree to which these
abilities differ between species is not
precisely known. Finally, it is often neces-
sary to first train monkeys to perform
cognitive tasks before studying the
neural correlates of cognitive processing
(although, see Qi et al., 2012). Training
can take many months, involves repeat-
edly rewarding successively more accu-
rate behavioral responses, is likely to
recruit reward-driven synaptic plasticity
in the cortex, and therefore is likely to
sculpt the computations performed by
the cortical neurons and networks that
are under study. It is not surprising then
that at the end of training, neural signals
are detected that reflect the cognitive
processing the task in question was de-
signed to recruit. However, it is not
possible, a priori, to predict, before neural
recording, which neural signals will
emerge, the nature of the neural represen-
tation that will enable successful perfor-
mance, the algorithm the brain will
discover during training, or even the
precise nature of the cognitive process
that ultimately will result. Neural recording
after training can help to answer all ofNeuronthese questions, and in some cases, the
answers are surprising.
In this issue of Neuron, Fitzgerald et al.
(2013) provide evidence that LIP neurons
encode categorically different task condi-
tions using a scalar neural code. In this
representation, firing rates of neurons
maintain a constant relation to one
another but scale together in parallel to
higher or lower levels to encode different
task conditions. This is surprising because
in prior studies, parietal cortex was found
to represent categorical task conditions
in cognitive tasks by selectively activating
largely distinct subpopulations of neurons
to encode each task condition, rather than
scaling activity in a single group of
neurons (Goodwin et al., 2012; Nieder
and Miller, 2004; Swaminathan and
Freedman, 2012). Fitzgerald et al. (2013)
were led to the conclusion that LIP em-
ployed a scalar code by their discovery
that the distribution of neurons in LIP
preferring each of several categories or
conditions in a task was strikingly biased.
Given a task with two or three outcomes,
they found that themajority of LIP neurons
were most active for the same outcome
and were similarly less active for the alter-
natives, leading to the idea that LIP
employed a scalar code to meet the cog-
nitive demands of the task. After elimi-
nating trivial accounts for this neuronal
bias based on themonkeys’ performance,
Fitzgerald et al. (2013) arrived at the insight
that the bias in population representation
was predicted by the prior finding that
network dynamics in area LIP were one-
dimensional (Ganguli et al., 2008).77, January 9, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 7
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neural activity in LIP during the delay
period of attention and perceptual deci-
sion tasks. They found that the firing rates
of LIP neurons exhibited the same relative
levels of activity with respect to one
another during the delay period that they
exhibited in their spontaneous activity,
during the intertrial interval (Ganguli
et al., 2008), suggesting that activity
scaled up or down to code task-critical
information. Representing the pattern of
activity in the network as a vector in
a rate space (with dimensions equal to
the number of neurons), a network em-
ploying one-dimensional dynamics would
represent information essentially by
lengthening or shortening the population
rate vector, rather than by changing its
direction (as the direction of the vector is
controlled by the distribution of firing rates
over neurons and not the global level of
activity). Fitzgerald et al. (2013) reasoned
that if LIP neurons utilized one-dimen-
sional dynamics and a scalar code to
differentiate between stimulus categories
and task conditions, then most neurons
would be maximally activated for the
same task condition, explaining the
observed population bias. By providing
strong evidence that population repre-
sentations in area LIP are biased and
neural dynamics are approximately one-
dimensional under a variety of task condi-
tions and cognitive demands, Fitzgerald
et al. (2013) strengthen the evidence that
this is a generalized characteristic of
how LIP neurons code information in
cognitive tasks.
In their report in this issue, Fitzgerald
et al. (2013) trained monkeys to perform
categorization, association, and percep-
tual decision tasks, and they recorded
neural activity in an area of posterior pari-
etal cortex (area LIP) known to play a role
in sensorimotor control (Snyder et al.,
1997), attention (Bisley and Goldberg,
2003; Gottlieb et al., 1998), and cognition
(Freedman and Assad, 2006; Kiani and
Shadlen, 2009). In the categorization
task, monkeys viewed a patch of dots
that moved in different directions and re-
ported whether each stimulus belonged
to one of two arbitrary motion categories
(up-left or down-right) by imposing a
diagonal category boundary based on
direction. In the paired-associate task,
monkeys learned to associate three pairs8 Neuron 77, January 9, 2013 ª2013 Elsevierof visual objects and selected the object
that was paired with a sample stimulus
each trial. In the perceptual decision
experiment, monkeys decided whether
to saccade to a red or green target based
on the direction of a visual motion stim-
ulus. In each case, monkeys discrimi-
nated between task conditions based on
a nominal cognitive variable (whether
category, association, or decision) that
could take on a small number of different
values in the experiment. Many of us
would have predicted that after training
and during performance, each category
or outcome in the task would activate
comparable numbers of LIP neurons
with comparable strength, because each
was rewarded with comparable fre-
quency and played an equivalent role in
controlling behavior.
Instead, what these authors show is
that the category preferences of LIP
neurons were highly biased. Many more
neurons were found to be selectively acti-
vated to encode motion category A than
B, for example, in spite of their behavioral
equivalence. A similarly skewed and
biased population representation was
observed in the paired associate and
perceptual decision tasks. Most neurons
in LIP preferred the same stimulus pair
or direction of motion, with relatively few
neurons preferring the others. What these
data imply is that rather than encoding
these categorically different task condi-
tions as discrete cognitive representa-
tions, parietal neurons rank them, coding
categories, associations, and decisions
as points along a neural continuum, as
‘‘more’’ or ‘‘less.’’ That suggests that LIP
neurons collectively signal a scalar value,
with different ranges of global activity cor-
responding to the different task condi-
tions. For example, given a task with three
conditions (A, B, and C), LIP neurons
might produce 30 impulses per second
to represent condition A, 20 impulses
per second to encode condition B, and
ten impulses per second to represent
category C (hence the biased population
preference for condition A). The readout
of task condition would then be based
on the overall firing rate in the population,
rather than on the distribution of firing
rates over neurons within the population.
The fact that Fitzgerald et al. (2013) were
able to show that this bias in population
representation generalized across indi-Inc.vidual monkeys, experimental paradigms,
and even laboratories suggests that it
might reflect a computational principle
rather than a task-specific effect.
An alternative explanation for the bias in
the population representation of cate-
gories was that since visual stimuli in
different categories varied in their visual
features (for example direction of motion),
a population bias in the preferred direc-
tion of LIP neurons could account for the
bias in category preferences observed.
Population biases among neurons tuned
to direction of movement have been
shown in area M1, for example (Naselaris
et al., 2006). However, in the present
case, the bias in population representa-
tion was much stronger during the delay
period after the offset of visual stimuli
than during the time that the stimuli were
visible (a bias in visual motion processing
would predict the reverse). In addition,
and importantly, the bias in population
representation was a function of training
to perform the categorization task. The
authors found that the distribution of
preferred direction categories in area LIP
was not similarly biased in a monkey
viewing the same motion stimuli before it
had been trained to categorize those
stimuli. These observations provide
compelling evidence that the bias is
augmented in the delay period, is a conse-
quence of training, and therefore does not
reflect an intrinsic (pre-existing) asymme-
try in the population distribution of
preferred motion directions in area LIP.
That is, the population bias arises during
training to meet the cognitive processing
demands of the task, rather than reflect-
ing how LIP neurons intrinsically encode
the visual stimuli involved.
Fitzgerald et al. (2013) found that spon-
taneous and evoked activity levels were
correlated in single neurons, as did Gang-
uli and colleagues (Ganguli et al., 2008).
One might wonder whether these data
suggest that one-dimensional dynamics
emerge as a consequence of neurons
differing in their intrinsic excitability. Both
groups observed that one-dimensional
dynamics were less prevalent during
periods of visual input, and this argues
against that interpretation. If differences
in excitability accounted for one-dimen-
sional dynamics, these dynamics should
be particularly evident when the network
was excited by extrinsic input. It still
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baseline level of activity across neurons
could contribute to one-dimensional
dynamics and scalar coding, in which
case signals driven by extrinsic input
would be superimposed on an initial and
persistent difference in baseline firing
rate. However, the present data provide
convincing evidence that the population
representation of task conditions is
considerably biased, and one would not
necessarily predict this on the basis of
pre-existing differences in the baseline
firing rate of neurons.
A strict one-dimensional coding
scheme would predict that all neurons
would have the same preferred category
in categorization tasks or exhibit the
same ranking of response magnitude
over categorically distinct task condi-
tions. Certainly, in this study and others
(Chafee et al., 2007; Freedman and As-
sad, 2006; Goodwin et al., 2012; Nieder
and Miller, 2004), this is not the case.
Although there may be a bias for neurons
to prefer some over other categories at
the population level, this bias is not abso-
lute, with some neurons preferring the
more weakly represented category. This
suggests that the population vector would
change in direction as well as length
to encode different categories, and it
becomes a question of the degree to
which scaling of activity versus redistribu-
tion of activity within the population
carries information about cognitive vari-
ables. Fitzgerald et al. (2013) describe
population dynamics in area LIP as being
‘‘low-dimensional’’ rather than one-
dimensional in categorization tasks, and
it is important to note that the mechanism
of neural coding in LIP sits somewhere inbetween a strict scalar code, utilizing
one-dimensional dynamics, and a more
traditional population code in which
different categories are at least partially
encoded by the redistribution of activity
over neurons. In addition, Fitzgerald
et al. (2013) are careful to note that one-
dimensional dynamics may emerge from
network constraints that do not derive
directly from the necessity to encode
categories or categorically distinct task
conditions. For example, to perform the
behavioral tasks they employed, cortical
networks had to sustain patterns of
activity in the absence of continuing sen-
sory input (to mediate working memory).
The required patterns of connectivity
between neurons could impose the pro-
portionality in firing rates observed. At
this point, therefore, the exact computa-
tional role of scalar coding in LIP and its
relation to behavior remains an open
question.
Still, the degree to which one-dimen-
sional dynamics pertain to the neural
representation of categories, as reflected
in the strong population biases observed,
is surprising. One would not necessarily
guess that the brain would scale activity
in the same group of neurons to represent
different categories, which are discrete
cognitive representations that differ in
kind rather than degree. Training mon-
keys to perform a cognitive paradigm
essentially guarantees that neural corre-
lates of the cognitive processing required
will be recovered after training. However,
as these results show, it is not possible
a priori to determine how the brain will
solve the cognitive problem that has
been set, or to determine the nature of
the computations that neurons willNeuronperform to mediate successful perfor-
mance. In some cases, the characteristics
of the underlying neural representation
are unanticipated.REFERENCES
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